The maelstrom is forming

For readers of this blog it should not be a surprise that the regime has chosen naked repression. The nomination of Tareck El Aissami as vice president was a clear indication of that. The man is a born killer, in search of a vengeance as early as his days in college.

It is not that Tareck IS the man, he is just the willing agent, the front of the "civilian" radical wing of chavismo, the one closely tied to Cuban interests to which Maduro, Jaua and some other belong. They may or may not be die hard communists, some do not have the intellectual baggage to know what Marxism is truly about. But they all have a mean anti system streak and if they have joined totalitarian regimes from the left side it is strictly a matter of historical moment.

So what has pushed that radical side to act? And act it did. Plenty of opposition leaders accused of conspiracy are being detained illegally as I type. And as I type the regime is also starting to clamp down on the embers of private enterprise. And one can expect any time that the very few independent papers left will close. And Internet is getting worse by the day and it is quite likely that the regime will block it any time soon.

So what triggered that angry regime reaction? Many things are listed next in no particular order except for the last one which is our T time.

The regime has managed to kill the recall election against Maduro. Now that it has two solid years ahead one could have expect some form of quiet. But no. The truth is that recall election or not the regime remains on shaky grounds. On the economic front leaked data would seem to indicate that the Central Bank of Venezuela is dealing with a 20%+ drop in the GDP while inflation for 2016 may have reached 800%+. The refusal of the regime to take any serious action to counter that implies further degradation and the regime, controlled by Cubans, know that. They may actually wish it as a way to control the populace through starvation diet. But there would be a cost.

The military remains an enigma even for the regime. That it has also started this week a purge in military ranks can only confirm such suspicions. Maybe the regime knows that the army was not going to fire at hungry crowds and it needed to purge it fast before the economy grew worse. Maybe it is just scared of a coup for which many motives exist. Let's remember that not all in the military are implied in drug trafficking and those do not see any reason to sacrifice themselves for those who did partake in drug traffic.

The international scene is not good either. Today the dialogue regime-opposition was supposed to restart but nothing happened and nobody was surprised. Even the foreign "pressure" on dialogue has become a lip service of sorts. As a matter of fact in a very late coming moment of lucidity the Obama administration has decided today to maintain in place the measures against the Venezuelan regime, extending them by a year. Surely this is something that will be of help for the coming Trump administration.

All of these developments have been known for a while by the regime. And even though the recall election has been killed the constitution clearly states that last December we should have had governor elections, followed by mayors. They were promised for the first semester of 2017 on flimsy reasons. Since the regime is sure to lose them these elections have not been convoked yet, and by now the logistics rule out these elections before June 2017. Which basically means that these will be held when convenient, preferably when the opposition has been made illegal so that we will have some form of one party electoral system. Even losing only half of states is simply unacceptable for the regime.

The regime was simply looking for an excuse to start its repression and the National Assembly gave one by declaring the political responsibility of the crisis on president Maduro, in a legal figure here called "abandono del cargo" which does not mean that Maduro is AWOL of Miraflores Palace but that he is not performing his job according to his constitutional obligations. That the vote stretches some parameters is true, That the high court TSJ was sure to find an illegal way to annul it was true. But one needs to understand the why of such vote, a why that to my great surprise is not understood from people like governor Falcon to journalists and Internet writers who consider it an error.

Let's see what are the opposition options. The National Assembly has been voided of all content. The excuse on the Amazonas alleged illegal elections has not been, amazingly, settled by the electoral court 13 months later. Nor will it be settled because it would mean new high risk elections. And also that excuse to void the National Assembly is too good to pass on. The opposition self sabotaged itself in the dialogue in exchange for nothing as the regime did not fulfill the engagements taken in front of third parties. That these third parties did not bother to arrive to Caracas this week shows that even those biased in favor of the regime have lost any sanguine sentiment on the subject.

Thus the opposition cannot legislate anything, is under direct threat, has no dialogue to look for. What else can it do but to promote a confrontation with the regime? Not doing so is akin to validate all what the regime has done. As such voting the "abandono" was a perfect move, that forced the regime to act since not doing so could have rendered vocal the inner divisions of the regime.

That it also opens the opposition to its division is a price to be paid. And that should be paid. The hallowed unity is now working against the opposition. Look for a button the secret negotiation between the regime and UNT to free Manuel Rosales who is back today in Zulia with a gigantic rally. We do not know what UNT will do now that it got what it wanted, but one thing is certain, it cannot be trusted anymore. If there is an abscess it should be drained well before any election happens. Besides, were UNT and Falcon to defect the opposition would still retain a majority in the Assembly. Those who will suffer the most are UNT who will be strictly limited to Zulia state as Rosales now cannot hope to be the unity candidate again. Then again maybe the only thing he wants is to be governor for life of Zulia. Same thing for Falcon who will remain cloistered in Lara. Neither one can win a primary within the opposition now, neither Caracas nor Valencia would vote for them. I suspect that they have decided to make a pact with the regime so that they are given a state with some resources and peace in such a way that the regime can still show them as a democracy Potemkin village. And bid their time for better days after 2020.

But I digress. The point here is that the National Assembly has decided finally, perhaps late but finally, to challenge head on the regime and this one has decided to execute what it had planned for a while.  Thus starts the political maelstrom that will lead to blood. It had been postponed for too long. There is no other way out now, even if the world decides to put pressure. It is too late, the regime and Cuba cannot take chances now that Fidel charisma is gone and that Trump is about to be sworn in while Europe cannot be relied upon as an escape from misery.

I would like to point out something that may have gone under the radar for many. Brazil and Colombia are starting to acknowledge that they are seeing the beginning of a refugee problem. Their border states are experiencing economic and service strains as Venezuelans come in for food and health care. And these countries are under no conditions to endure a refugee crisis which would be on a par with the Syria one. Surprises may be coming as Venezuela, unlike Cuba, is not an island.

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2017 perspectives

Certainly it is a fool's errand to make any predictions for 2017, even if it is this time of the year when pundits dust off their crystal balls. Yet, this week has seen enough action that we can confidently describe the engines that will drive the political year. With a 97,63% odds for the country to crash in a wall.

The regime is cornered. So Maduro, trying to rise above chavismo divisions and his fears that the military may not be fully behind him, did his ultimate provocation: to name a radical cabinet where the intentions are clear. Those are to break anything that is not already fully controlled by the regime. The short list is the opposition leadership, the rump private sector still existing (least they would fund a political campaign for dog catcher), universities and private education. That is all I think, there is nothing else left.


For this he has named avowed communists to economic posts, and radical narko and/or terrorists at the security levels. The military still control the key posts of defense and food, those where the money is. Not to improve these sectors, but to make sure that they are the ones to take their slice first. Journalists Hannah Dreier and Joshua Goodman had a wonderful, frightening piece about how corrupt is the Venezuelan army at all levels. I can vouch from my own experiences, personal ones and those of my clients and providers they these writers are not exaggerating a bit. In fact I could tell worse stories if I were not afraid of my own security and of those involved. Remember: this is a dictatorship and I write FROM Venezuela. Besides, even if I were to report on such things to which Venezuelan court should I go? This will have to wait for better days when it will become possible to prosecute criminals. Meanwhile there is plenty of work to be done elsewhere.

Faced with the perspective of more repression, more looting, more ruin, more misery, more hunger, more disease, the National Assembly did the only thing it could do, throw away any pretense of dialogue and challenge the regime.  The challenge is simple; let's have general elections for everything and see who "el pueblo" is with. That is truly the only thing the opposition can do as the high court of Venezuela has stripped it unconstitutionally of its prerogatives. Never mind that Maduro has even cut any funds for the Assembly as representatives have not gotten a pay check in months, apparently.

The opposition also threw a direct challenge at the Venezuelan Army by telling them they should chose between a narco/terrorist regime or democracy.  The army replied swiftly with the expected words from Defense minister Padrino as to Maduro being inside the constitution and the opposition not (he counted the votes in 2015, he knows first hand who is on top even if he pretends to the contrary). But his words of fealty to Maduro are not interesting, the speed of his reply is. Clearly in front of such a challenge a careful worded answer would have needed a couple of days. Certainly an immediate buzz Trump-like tweet could have been sent, but the reply with all necessary arguments should have taken longer. That it was so speedy and so incomplete and almost besides the point tells me that the army is now controlled by a tight small committee that does not consult any one else in the ranks. I am taking here at most of a couple of  dozen generals and admirals (note that Venezuela has more generals than the US). Far from reassuring, that Padrino letter raises more doubts about what is really going on inside the army and what hold he has at this point.

Thus in front such stern positions there is no point in awaiting for a renewed dialogue. The opposition has stated clearly that it does not plan to attend on January 13 and thus the regime sent the bro/sis team to the Vatican in a hurry to try to have the Vatican seat the opposition leadership. At least Jorge and Delcy did have time for some lingerie shopping, they do have dollars you see. yet, note that mediators are not back in town and that they had to go to Rome to ask the Vatican to come back. January 13 does not look good for the regime which counts on a "dialogue" to gain time. It worked out well since it gave an excuse to suppress a recall election that would have been suppressed anyway. But there are limits.

The thing about the dialogue is that the world is starting to shrink around the regime. When you name a Hezbollah friend and known paramilitary organizer involved in drug trafficking as the vice president of a country you need to compensate throwing flowers from some window. At the end of last year Mercosur gave the boot to Venezuela. A few days ago Peru opened its borders to Venezuelan refugees, quite an embarrassment for a regime that pretends we are all fat and healthy and happy. With Trump about to be sworn in the real danger is not that the OAS applies sanctions to Venezuela, it is that the US sends the OAS ad patres and organizes an anti Venezuelan coalition of those that matter. Mind you, Trump will not waste a Marine's drop of blood on Venezuela but he will apply such a quarantine on a bratty country that the Cuban embargo will be a child's play. And not even to get its hand on a Venezuelan oil that frankly, my dear, the US does not give a damn about it anymore. At least with a functional OAS, even if banned, Venezuela could lodge complaints........

These are the driving forces of what will unfold over the next months. A regime whose leadership faces international prosecution fights for its survival and cannot come up with anything else but put in charge its worst elements. An opposition that has nothing left but prepare for massive protests and massive repression. An army that needs to figure out whether it has any future left as an army. An international community that is becoming aware of Venezuela as a time bomb for refugees.

You do the math and forge your own vision for the first semester of 2017.

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Maduro names the cabinet from hell

The news came as a surprise. Not that a new cabinet was unexpected: around January 10 everyone expected Maduro to name a new Vice President, the one that would succeed him as president if he resigns, or is resigned. But no one expected Tareck Zaidan El Aissami Maddah to become that vice-president. This is truly awful. And if you look at who is being named along to some key portfolios it gets worse.

So let's start with our Tareck boy.


Before we read into the nomination importance, let's look at his career. He is from a Syrian Druze family. Nothing wrong with being a Druze. Except that they support Assad and Chia and that sort of assorted terrorism (while those in Israel are well integrated in the state structure, go figure).

When young he militated with the left and was on board with Chavez, with a quick ascent (through Chavez brother who was a teacher of him it seems).

He was associated for 5 years with the Interior ministry, eventually becoming the minister himself before Chavez placed him in the crucial state of Aragua as governor. This is extremely important because Tareck was always at hand when the drug traffic system of Venezuela was organized big time. It was also the period when Chavez became interested in paramilitary ventures from the bolivarian militia to the dreaded colectivos of today. Amen of the close links to Iran and Syria, such as the weekly flight to Teheran for which there was no way to get a seat.

As a result Tareck El Assaimi was named in the Wall Street journal among those officials in Venezuela investigated by the DEA and what not for illicit activities. There is no doubting why Tareck easily deserves a spot there. In Spanish here, with pic included.

Since he has been governor he has the reputation to spend more time in Caracas than Maracay. It is to be noted that at first Chavez wanted him far in Tachira but Tareck had ways to impose his presence close to the action, Indeed he has been quite vocal in particular against any dialogue or any concession for the opposition. That he lost badly, real bad in Aragua assembly vote in December 2015 certainly angered him. Let's note that his own election in 2012 was with a surprising 55% in a state that normally historically gives 60% or more to leftist parties. He is clearly an imposed figure there, but his time has come.

There is only one reading possible in naming Tareck El Assaimi vice president of Venezuela at a time where he could become president until 2019 without an election if something were to happen to Nicolas Maduro. An appointed president, without a vote anywhere. Think about this: a terrorist sympathizer, milita and paramilitary organizer, likely drug trafficker, indicted in the US, is now the vice president of Venezuela. A vice president that cannot travel in any country with Interpol.

The message is clear, the regime has appointed somebody that has no problem to dip his hands in blood. Why do you think this is for? What would be the regime's intentions for the next few months?

How come he made it to such a position above so many big sharks in the pond? Because Tareck represents several groups. The terrorists with unsavory links across the world, but not the largest of chavismo group. But surely he has the contacts. He also represents the civilian narco economic wing. The wing that became drug trafficker by cupidity and pleasure rather than following geopolitical orders from Fidel and Hugo. I am not making any excuses for the military who "followed orders": all drug capos end up in the same gutter of violence. He is also a voice for the radical commie left civilian section (more below). He also has links with the corrupt bolibourgeoisie though if I were them I would think about leaving the country because Tareck knows where and how to get money if he needs it. As such his main ally in the regime is Diosdado Cabello and we could almost assume that he is the anti military establishment candidate, having only those deeply in drug trafficking on his side. Is this a provocation against Padrino? Or does it mean that the regime has finally prevailed and that the army will repress now at will?

Now that you know what the new vice president represents let's look at the ones getting in, a not reassuring perspective whatsoever.

Elias Jaua is now at education. That means radical ideology. He is of the band that think ideologization should be decisive in schools (even if his own children go to a famous private school). Jaua has been a life long communist, from neo terrorist activities in college to presiding over the massive expropriations of lands that have left us without food. He is an intellectual brute and has no problem taking the necessary measures to make sure that his ideology prevails, the ruin of the country being a small price to pay, just as it happened in Cuba.

Tareck and Hugbel salad days promoting riots at
Universidad de Los Andes

Jaua super ministry has for right hand Hugbel Roa who became recently quite infamous when he accused the new Venezuela cardinal of pedophilia (we are awaiting the evidence still) and when confronted through his microphone to the face of the represantive questioning his accusations. Quite a democrat. The obvious question for Roa is that since he allegedly knew that the cardinal loved little children so much, how come he was not arrested yet. The real reason for the irate Representative is elsewhere, Baltazar Porras is the one that saw Chavez asking for help and crying in 2002...

The finance and economy ministries are fused into a single super ministry one that will be presided by representative Ramon Lobo. Ain't that funny on how so many chavistas desert their assembly seat with such ease? Do they know something we do not know? But I digress.

Lobo has been a nobody in the regime. Oh, yes, he has been around for a while but this is the first time he hits jackpot. Before that he was mayor of La Azulita, which means Podunck for all practical purposes except that they have good coffee beans, smuggled to Colombia probably. Then they put him for Merida state representative. But he could not win his district seat, and made it because he also was candidate on the list system that ensured that the PSUV would get at least one seat in Merida. (note: the current governor is a communist).  So what does Lobo brings to his curriculum to direct Venezuela's economy having only directed the administration of a small rural district? Well, he is a life long communist. He also studied economy in college. Already a plus among chavismo [sigh...] But besides "academic" work and political agitation there is no evidence that he ever held a real job anywhere, you know those with real responsibility, that require you to make investment decisions, budgeting stuff out or real earnings, etc... From economy the only things he knows is to wait for the stipend from Caracas and spend it until he runs out of cash. And then blame Caracas. To deal with a country on the edge of official bankruptcy I am afraid it does not add up.

At labor ministry we have Francisco Torrealba another representative that leaves like a rat the National Assembly. I could not find much about him but I know of him as he was a main voice in attacking and making a case for chavismo as to how useless and illegal the National assembly is. But coming from the extremely corrupt labor direction inside chavismo, there is nothing good to expect from him, being a commie or not is irrelevant in that regime position.

So there you go, a most radical new government, and that without counting those that remain in like Molina who says that only chavistas have the right to be public workers, a violent promoter of apartheid for political reasons.

This is a cabinet named to destroy the opposition, to erase what is left of the private sector. This the first outright communist cabinet. As far as I know there is no "moderate" voice as the few military inside of it have been collaborating actively with the crazy left of the regime in the past. Let's just say that Padrino may have at most half a dozen supporters left. And I am very generous in assuming that Padrino has not fully caved in. He is himself a communist but reined in some of the excesses of the regime for his wish not to become the "el pueblo" murderer in history books.

This is a cabinet named to finish the opposition. It is a group that could not care less about world criticism of their actions. They are in to make sure that the opposition becomes powerless, and then, when all the necessary crimes are committed, that the opposition cannot mount a challenge, they will run totally flawed elections that they will win with major fraud, to justify their crimes.

Whether they succeed is another story.

You have been told.

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PS: note that Tareck likes the good life, He tends to be nattily dressed when in private and likes very much stuff about like soccer, like, you know, owning teams and being hired as a striker, Qaddafi son's style. Do Druzes drink booze?

PS2: Jaua also is leaving the National Assembly. This is quite a razzia the regime makes in the Assembly PSUV faction.

PS3: already in 2014 O'Grady at the Wall Street Journal had quite a portrait of Tareck El Assaimi.  I mean, the world knows what this guy stands for. Who will dare be seen shaking hands in public?

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A vision of 2017

While Diosdado Cabello was scheming to dismiss once and for all the National Assembly, on January 3 while on a flight to Punto Fijo a plane mechanical problem forced him into emergency landing in Curaçao. During the protocolar routine registry of the plane weapons and money were found, forcing Curaçao gouvernement to hold Cabello in the island and giving time to the US to officially demand extradition on January 5, with a duly request to the Netherlands. On December 6 the Venezuelan Navy decided to blockade Curaçao but as the first ship arrived in view of Willemstad a US fighter dropped a charge a few hundred meters ahead showing that they were determined to get their man this time around. This coupled, of course, with the US Navy receiving orders to protect the shipping lanes to and from Curaçao. On December 10 Cabello was flown to the US as relations were totally severed between Venezuela and Canada, USA and the Netherlands.

Meanwhile in Caracas the MUD opposition broke over supporting Diosdado Cabello since the US had released evidence against Cabello and by a one vote majority installed as a new chair to the National Assembly that refused to support Cabello. The regime declared the National Assembly in treason to the fatherland and on December 19 the TSJ high court dissolved it while the army seized the National Assembly at night.

Even though a blackout in communication was established the MUD managed to call for massive demonstrations on January 23, the anniversary of 1958, the year when democracy returned to Venezuela. If the extensive rallies were pacific in nature the "colectivos" did manage provocations and the Nazional Guard with Maduro, in fear of future such displays of street power decided to repress. This one got out of hand and by January 25 we could count more than 200 killed, scores of injured and jailed people.

Mercosur struck back first and in an unanimous vote expelled Venezuela on January 30. Venezuela severed relations with Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay. But Uruguay decided to sever relations anyway on February 2, annulling a ridiculous attempt at division by Venezuela playing favorites. At the same time on February 2 the chair of UNASUR was disowned by 5 countries who refused to gather for a summit unless Samper was ousted and a condemnation against Maduro's regime violence was unanimous and public. Thus died UNASUR, useless from day one of its existence.

Meanwhile as the Obama administration faded the new State Secretary made no bones in pressuring the OAS to condemn Venezuela by implementing once and for all the Democratic Charter in its full force. Sensing that this could mean the end of the OAS just as UNASUR unraveled, consensus build fast for this outcome and by February 9 it was clear what the vote at the OAS would be. Amen of the European Union condemnation of Venezuela for its attempted attack against one of its members state in late January.

The regime was unable to deal with the situation not only because its crimes could not be excused but also because its foreign service made mistake over mistake. In spite of Cuba's help and threats by February 8 six countries in the Americas had broken with Cuba as the US reversed all signs of ouverture left from Obama's rapprochement policy. It was time for the regime to take a dose of Realiticum. On February 10 Maduro appointed Vladimir Padrino as president, replaced Delcy Rodriguez at the foreign ministry dispatching in a hurry Timoteo Zambrano as new minister to the OAS assembly, and resigned.

If Padrino could not stop the OAS from suspending Venezuela he did get a few days before sanctions were fully decided upon. But democracy was not going to return just like that. After all, half of the National Assembly was either in jail or in exile and two dead. Besides the corrupt military was ready to repress further thinking, naively, that removing Maduro was enough. As a consequence of that army division on February 20 a limited agreement was signed with a portion of the opposition recognizing Padrino as president under three conditions that within a year a new Electoral Board would be named, that elections would be held and that negotiations to reopen the National Assembly would be held with all parts so that its work would resume once a global agreement for governance for the next two years would be nailed.

In short, even the more recalcitrant voices of the opposition were forced to accept that the regime would survive for at least another year. Which did not mean that chavismo was on board as many of its components refused the deal even though they did nothing to stop it. And not forgetting the deep division within the army.

Even though food riots continued, that shortages became worse, Padrino could start to rule and reorganize the country. The pace would be glacial but would exist. Repression notwithstanding, by May a free market of currency exchange was established along a refurbished and devaluated official rate. By July a system of subsidies for the poorest was set in place while most price controls were officially lifted. A wave of inflation hit the country but by October the monthly average was down towards a rate below 200% yearly.

The problem of Padrino was that even though the price of oil went up to 60, the status of pariah country did not allow him to borrow as needed. Nor could borrow the private sector nearly collapsed. There was a need of political settlement. The first thing was to put all of the blame on Nicolas Maduro.  As an investigation on the crimes of January 23 was launched the new regime allowed Maduro to leave for exile to Cuba on March first. At the same time three other major figures of the regime applied for asylum in Nicaragua and Bolivia, a convenient way for Padrino to ease some of the culpability he so richly deserved.

The National Assembly agreement was signed on March 10 and this one was seated again and finally recognized by the TSJ, though not all of the 2016 actions against it were reversed. In particular the deputies from Amazonas were declared null without any election previewed to replace them, killing the 2/3 majority once and for all. To avoid a civil war the MUD had to accept these conditions getting in exchange the freedom of most political prisoners and the recovery of the National Assembly TV, but only for cable transmission. The rest of press and media remained controlled.

The meek financial measures of Padrino were approved by the Assembly and a legal budget was voted allowing Padrino to start renegotiating some of the debt of Venezuela starting in July. On July 17 a mutiny in a barrack showed that Padrino was far from controlling the army and he was forced into concluding a political settlement of sorts. But the divisions inside the MUD had also taken their toll and both exhausted sides decided to sign the final truce: a new CNE was finally installed early August and elections were called for December but only for municipal council and state legislatures. Governors and mayors were left for 2018. And for December 2018 it was tentatively accepted that both a new president and a new Assembly would be elected.

While all of this was taking place Padrino had started a move to control crime, in particular the one that stopped production from increasing. As such violence was heavy in the countryside as gangs were rounded up and, well, massacred. A famous prison was also taken to break down the notorious system of ransom and extortion managed from inside that penal location. But that army had neither the wish or the guts to tackle crime as it should. "colectivos" still ruled large sectors of cities while all evidence seemed to indicate that drug trafficking kept running smoothly and FARC collaboration was untouched. Rural safety would only start showing some signs of improvement late in 2017 while city security remained as bad, if not worse in some areas.

All in all the country muddled through. If shortages were not solved at least by December they were not getting worse. Crime was not dealt with but at least a credible intention to reduce it now existed. After the dive of the first semester it was a relief that things did not get worse in the second semester.  The regime in a strange show of optimism decided to go ahead with that runt of an election, benefiting in its eyes from the opposition divisions, the impossibility thus to clearly score victory or defeat to its real extent. The idea of course was to give enough time to local leadership to regenerate in order to avoid a major disaster in 2018.

But it was too late for the regime. The campaign was marred when evidence that the help to Cuba remained high while the problems fo the country were far from solved. The result was without appeal. Division of the opposition and all pro regime electoral advantage considered, the regime could only keep a state majority in only 5 states, and lost the 15 most important cities councils.

The Padrino experiment had run its course. He had not been able (or was that unwilling?) to do real reforms and any improvement that the country may have sensed in late 2017 was in real danger to be lost in the dort quarter of 2018. Food riots were frequent again, as well as the novelty of one major hospital burned down by an angry mob. To avoid utter discomfiture and the real risk of a massive popular revolt Padrino started 2018 breaking with the Cuban life line and accepting governor and mayor elections for April, hoping to ride on that wave of strong decisions. For good measure it was announced that no governor would be nominated for reelection, MUD or chavismo, as the price to set a date. This also went for the 15 major mayors.

But it all came for naught. The opposition won all but two states, some with 20 points margin, in spite of its division. A large majority of town halls went also for the opposition, many where the opposition was united by a 2 to 1 margin.

The Padrino transition had failed, eaten by its own demons. On May 11 Padrino named opposition sage Aveledo vice president and resigned on the 12. It was up to Aveledo to direct the last 6 months of transition until the December election, facing a portion of unreconstructed army that, though an opposition concession, could not be touched until 2019. And thus chavismo and opposition entered the maelstrom of a presidential campaign divided, in a country which crisis seemed endless in spite of some occasional improvements. But at least the Cuban pension had stopped, the OAS and Mercosur welcomed back Venezuela and international help started to flow. And Aveledo could release the last political prisoners, in particular Leopoldo Lopez, the big hope of chavismo to wreck opposition unity in 2018.

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This game-of-thronian fantasy is my new year present to my dear readers. May you have the best possible 2017. And pray for us who are reading or writing from Venezuela.

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